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PATENT ELIGIBILITY AND PHYSICALITY IN THE EARLY 
HISTORY OF PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 
Ben McEniery* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In recent times, the courts have been asked to determine whether, and 
to what extent, the patent system protects claims to inventions that do not 
involve a machine or other physical device and do not involve a physical 
transformation of matter from one state to another. It is uncontroversial that 
the patent system exists to provide an incentive to encourage the invention 
and commercialization of new products and processes and the disclosure by 
the patent applicant of information sufficient to enable a person skilled in 
the relevant field of technology to reproduce the claimed invention. This 
disclosure is the quid pro quo of the patent system; it is the benefit the pub-
lic receives in exchange for the State bestowing monopoly rights on a pri-
vate individual.1 
There is no dispute that patent law’s incentive function is appropriate 
for promoting the invention of new and useful physical machines or other 
devices, along with new methods that physically transform matter. Howev-
er, what is not clear and what the courts are having difficulty grappling with 
is whether the concept of patent eligibility is broad enough to encompass 
non-physical methods, namely those that do not involve a machine or other 
physical device and do not involve a physical transformation of matter from 
one state to another. 
In this respect, the courts have been charged with formulating rules that 
can be used to distinguish between inventions that fall within the scope of 
patentable subject matter and unpatentable abstract ideas or principles. The 
current state of uncertainty in patentable subject matter jurisprudence is a 
result of misguided attempts to construct bright-line rules that can supposed-
ly decide the difficult questions of subject matter eligibility according to § 
101 of the Patents Act.2 
 
 *  BA LLB (Hons) (UQ) LLM (QUT) PhD (QUT), Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, 
Queensland University of Technology; Barrister-at-Law. 
 1. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encour-
agement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare.”). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2015) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). 
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The issue confronting the courts arises now because the world is in the 
midst of a shift from the Industrial Age to being a knowledge-based econo-
my of the Information Age.3 Knowledge-based economies are those in 
which there is a greater reliance on intellectual capabilities than on physical 
inputs or natural resources.4 They are “[those] which are directly based on 
the production, distribution, and use of knowledge and information.”5 While 
manufactured products and manufacturing processes continue to be, and will 
likely always be, of great worth, we recognize that innovation manifests 
itself in the reduction of new and useful ideas to specific practical applica-
tion. As such, the production and manipulation of new kinds of information 
and ideas will be of substantial value. 
Identifying the scope of patent eligibility at this time is an undertaking 
of significant importance and difficulty as inventors seek to challenge the 
accepted bounds of patentable subject matter. Doing so is integral to deter-
mining whether much of the cutting edge innovation we are likely to witness 
in the emerging technology areas of the Information Age of the late twenti-
eth century and beyond will receive the same encouragement as the industri-
al and manufacturing technologies of previous times. 
Examples of the kinds of rapidly advancing technology for which pa-
tents are being sought in the infancy of the Information Age can be seen in 
recently decided Supreme Court cases, particularly those involving non-
physical inventions that are computer-implemented business methods. The 
Supreme Court in Bilski v. Kappos considered whether a method of hedging 
risk in electricity markets is patentable subject matter; the idea was to mini-
mize the input costs of an electricity provider that must sell to consumers at 
a fixed rate despite purchasing at a variable rate.6 But in Alice Corp. Propri-
etary Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, the patents held by Alice Corporation 
disclosed a computerized trading platform that eliminates “counterparty” or 
“settlement” risk, being the risk that only one party to a financial transaction 
performs its obligation to pay, leaving the other party without its principal or 
the benefit of the counterparty’s performance.7 Mayo Collaborative Services 
v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. concerned a method of medical diagnosis 
designed to ensure a patient receives an optimal dose of a pharmaceutical to 
maximize the pharmaceutical’s effectiveness and minimize its side effects. 
As the Court’s decisions in the cases and the decisions of the courts below 
 
 3. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 18 
(1996). 
 4. See id. at 10, 30. 
 5. Id. at 7. 
 6. 561 U.S. 593, 597–99 (2010). 
 7. 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352, 2359 (2014). 
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demonstrate, the difficult issues that arise at the margins of patentable sub-
ject matter are not easily solved.8 
The starting point for any discussion of the scope of patent eligible sub-
ject matter is 35 U.S.C. § 101, which recites four enumerated categories of 
patentable subject matter: “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and use-
ful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”9 
While no explicit exclusions follow the broad language of 35 U.S.C. § 
101, the Supreme Court has identified three general categories of excluded 
matter: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.10 The ra-
tionale for these judicially recognized categories of excluded subject matter 
is pre-emption, namely that “patent law not inhibit further discovery by im-
properly tying up the future use of these building blocks of human ingenui-
ty.”11 Various scholars have argued that these categories of excluded matter 
should be applied restrictively so that we do not exclude from the patent 
system whole fields of endeavor,12 that we should rely principally on the 
other requirements for patentability to preclude undeserving patents,13 and 
that we should recognize that § 101 does not impose additional requirements 
on patentability.14 
The Supreme Court, in Mayo, set down a framework for distinguishing 
patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas 
from those that claim applications of those concepts.15 The first asks whether 
claims are directed to a patentable concept.16 If they are, the second step 
asks whether the additional elements recited in the claim “transform the 
nature of the claim” into a patentable application by reciting an “inventive 
concept” that is “sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 
significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”17 The 
 
 8. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294–1295 (2012). 
 9. Questions of subject matter eligibility pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101 are separate to 
and distinct from the requirements that, to be patentable, an invention must be novel, non-
obvious, and useful. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2015). The invention claimed must also be 
described in sufficient detail and enabled so that one with ordinary skill in the subject matter 
of the patent can make and use the invention. Id. at § 112. 
 10. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354. 
 11. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1301 (citation 
omitted)). 
 12. E.g., John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 609, 613–614 (2009). 
 13. E.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1342 (2011). 
 14. See, e.g., Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 591–93 
(2008). 
 15. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294. 
 16. See id. at 1297. 
 17. Id. at 1294, 1297. 
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difficulty lies in identifying when a claimed invention falls into one of these 
judicially recognized categories of excluded subject matter, and that diffi-
culty is particularly acute when the patent in question is a method that lacks 
a physical embodiment. 
While the Supreme Court to some extent addressed the question in 
Bilski v. Kappos when it held that the presence of a physical aspect in an 
invention is a “clue” indicating patent eligibility, it failed to set clear guide-
lines that explain the circumstances in which a non-physical invention might 
be patentable.18 Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion in Bilski v. 
Kappos, rightfully criticized the Court’s failure in this regard: 
The Court, in sum, never provides a satisfying account of what consti-
tutes an unpatentable abstract idea. Indeed, the Court does not even ex-
plain if it is using the machine-or-transformation criteria. The Court es-
sentially asserts its conclusion that petitioners’ application claims an ab-
stract idea. This mode of analysis (or lack thereof) may have led to the 
correct outcome in this case, but it also means that the Court’s musings 
on this issue stand for very little.
19
 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have also failed to provide this 
guidance, despite finding various non-physical inventions to be patent ineli-
gible.20 The Court’s failure in this regard has meant that while it has rejected 
the notion that a physicality requirement is the sole test for determining pa-
tent eligibility, it is not clear whether the lack of a physical embodiment in 
an invention is being used as a de facto proxy for a finding that an invention 
is an abstract idea and therefore unpatentable subject matter. 
These difficulties must be resolved in a way that allows the patent sys-
tem to accommodate both traditional industrial technologies as well as the 
new and emerging technologies that are the hallmark of the Information 
Age. Because the integral elements of the patent system have been apparent 
since its inception, any discernible rationale for its existence is to be found 
in both its history and form.21 As Benjamin Cardozo said, “Some concep-
tions of the law owe their existing form almost exclusively to history.”22 
 
 18. See 561 U.S. 593, 594 (2010). 
 19. Id. at 621 (2010). 
 20. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 
2354 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 
(2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1289 (2012). 
 21. See BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760–1911, (1999); Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Back-
ground of the English Patent Law, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 615, 615 (1959) (“The basic truths 
found by the English 400 years ago are still valid today and should continue to influence us in 
the interpretation and application of our law, even though it has become greatly refined and 
perfected.”); Paul E. Schaafsma, An Economic Overview of Patents, 79 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 241, 242 (1997). 
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Indeed, history is an indelible part of the patentable subject matter test. 
The term manufacture that is used in 35 U.S.C. § 101 is derived from the 
expression, “manner of new manufacture,” which appears in § 6 of the Stat-
ute of Monopolies.23 Furthermore, it is clear that the United States patent 
system is based upon, adopts, and incorporates many of the features of the 
English patent practice that preceded it.24 
The history needed to interpret modern laws was considered in the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in In re Bilski25 but was not replicated in much 
detail in the opinions published by the Supreme Court when it heard the 
matter on appeal in Bilski v. Kappos.26 In the Federal Circuit, both Justice 
Dyk for the concurrence and Justice Newman in dissent asserted that the 
English patent law and practice that preceded the birth of the United States 
patent system supported his own view regarding the patent eligibility of 
non-physical business methods.27 Justice Dyk expressed the view that “pa-
tents registered in England under the Statute of Monopolies before 1793 
were limited to articles of manufacture, machines for manufacturing, com-
positions of matter, and related processes.”28 
Justice Newman, in dissent, took the opposite view that the Statute of 
Monopolies only prohibited odious monopolies in favor of known indus-
tries, trades, products, and processes and that its enactment cannot be used 
in support of arguments today against the patenting of business methods and 
other non-physical methods.29 Her Honor in expressing this view stated that 
“[i]t is apparent that economic, or ‘business method,’ or ‘human activity’ 
patents were neither explicitly nor implicitly foreclosed from access to the 
English patent system.”30 
With the purpose of shedding light on the current uncertainty surround-
ing the patentability of knowledge and information-based method inven-
tions, this article takes up the debate and examines the patent system from 
its earliest days in the Republic of Venice and in England to its adoption in 
the United States of America and through to the present day. It does so to 
demonstrate that the history of patent law and practice supports non-
physical method inventions as being within the bounds of patentable subject 
matter. 
 
 
 22. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 52 (1921). 
 23. Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Ja. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents. 
 24. See, e.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 18, (1829). 
 25. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 950–52 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). 
 26. 561 U.S. 593 (2010). 
 27. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 985–87, (Dyk, J., Concurring, Newman, J., Dissenting). 
 28. Id. at 970. 
 29. Id. at 988–89. 
 30. Id. at 989. 
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II. THE EARLY HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT LAW 
The history of the patent system reveals it to be a tool to promote inno-
vation and economic development. From its earliest days, monopoly protec-
tion has been granted to those who disclose new technological advances that 
promote the progress of the useful arts. Traditionally, this has been under-
stood as being the domain of the industrial manufacturer, artisan, engineer, 
and draftsman.31 This history, coupled with the history of technology’s de-
velopment, has led to a generally held expectation that patent protection is 
limited to innovation embodied in machines or other physical devices of 
industrial application and in manufacturing processes that involve manipu-
lating or transforming physical matter.32 
However, these traditional conceptions do not necessarily accord with 
what is patentable at law. While the patent eligibility of machines and phys-
ically transformative methods is evident from the earliest patent cases,33 the 
history of patent law by no means restricts the scope of patent eligibility to 
the classes of invention these traditional conceptions envisage. 
Many significant sources, written mainly in the twentieth century, re-
veal the early history and rationale of patent law.34 Those sources reveal that 
 
 31. Richard H. Stern, Being Within the Useful Arts as a Further Constitutional Re-
quirement for U.S. Patent-Eligibility, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 6, 15 (2009). 
 32. The King v. Wheeler (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 345 at 349–50 (Eng.); Diamond v. Diehr, 
450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (“Industrial processes . . . are the types which have historically 
been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.”); LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD 
SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 324 (2d ed. 2004) (“[T]he image of the invention 
as the human intervention into nature that brings about a resulting physical change that un-
derpins much contemporary jurisprudence, was well entrenched in British law by the mid-
nineteenth century.”). 
 33. See, e.g., Crane v. Price (1842) 4 Man. & G. 580 (Eng.); The King v. Wheeler 
(1819) 2 B. & Ald. 345 (Eng.); Hornblower v. Boulton (1799) 8 T. R. 95 (Eng.); Boulton and 
Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 (Eng.). 
 34. 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1945); HAROLD G. 
FOX, MONOPOLIES AND PATENTS: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND FUTURE OF THE PATENT 
MONOPOLY (1947); CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, THE 
ENGLISH PATENT SYSTEM, 1660–1800 (1988); SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 21; Adam 
Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550–1800, 52 
HASTINGS L. J. 1255 (2000–2001); Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of 
Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Administration, 1787–1836 (Part 2), 80 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11 (1998); Schaafsma, supra note 21; Edward C. Walterscheid, To 
Promote the Progress of Useful Arts: American Patent Law and Administration, 1787–1836 
(Part 1), 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 61 (1997) [hereinafter American Patent Law 
(Part 1)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: 
Antecedents (Part 5, Part II), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 665 (1996) [hereinafter 
Antecedents (Part 5ii)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States 
Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 5, Part I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 615 (1996) 
[hereinafter Antecedents (Part 5i)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the 
United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 4), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 77 
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it is often mistakenly thought that the origins of United States patent law and 
the legal concepts of invention and inherent patentability lie in the English 
Parliament enacting the Statute of Monopolies in 1624.35 In truth, patent 
law’s origins predate the Statute of Monopolies and lie in the practice of the 
English Crown granting monopoly rights in inventions that arose prior to the 
passing of that statute,36 which itself was based on the early patent custom in 
the Republic of Venice.37  
A. Early Patent Custom in the Republic of Venice 
European patent custom originally developed in the Republic of Venice 
from the desire of rulers in the fifteenth century to encourage the develop-
ment of new industries within their realms.38 The idea of granting monopo-
lies originated in early European commerce to encourage individuals, com-
 
(1996) [hereinafter Antecedents (Part 4)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of 
the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 3), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
771 (1995) [hereinafter Antecedents (Part 3)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution 
of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 2), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
849 (1994) [hereinafter Antecedents (Part 2)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution 
of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1), 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
697 (1994) [hereinafter Antecedents (Part 1)]; Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the 
Progress of the Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual 
Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1994) [hereinafter 
Science and Useful Arts]; Frank D. Prager, Historical Background and Foundation of Ameri-
can Patent Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 309 (1961) [hereinafter Historical Background]; 
Klitzke, supra note 21; Frank D. Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual 
Property, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 106 (1952) [hereinafter The Early Growth]; Frank D. Prager, 
A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 711 (1944) 
[hereinafter History of Intellectual Property]; P. J. Federico, Origins and Early History of 
Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 294 (1929); D. Seaborne Davies, Further Light on The Case of 
Monopolies, 48 L. Q. R. 394 (1932); E. Wyndham Hulme, On the History of Patent Law in 
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 18 L. Q. R. 280 (1902) [hereinafter History of 
Patent Law]; E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative 
and at Common Law – A Sequel [hereinafter Sequel], 16 L. Q. R. 44 (1900); E. Wyndham 
Hulme, The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at Common Law, 12 L. 
Q. R. 141 (1896) [hereinafter History]. 
 35. Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Ja. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), available at http://www.legis
lation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents. 
 36. SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 21, at 208–09 (citing W. Mackinnon, Patent Laws, 
36 HANSARD COL. 555 (1837)) (“[T]here was ‘no express statute according to which patents 
might be granted . . . the granting did not rest upon the foundation of statute law.’”). 
 37. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 11; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, 
at 704–06. 
 38. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 11; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, 
at 855–56; Federico, supra note 34, at 292; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 
34, at 704–06; Klitzke, supra note 21; Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. 
OF THE PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 167 (1948) (translated by F.D. Prager); Hulme, Sequel, supra 
note 34, at 44–56; Hulme, History, supra note 34, at 141–54. 
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panies, and cities to engage in commercial ventures that entailed great risk. 
These trading monopolies granted exclusive rights to practice a certain art or 
to make, use, or sell a certain article. Their object was the promotion of new 
industries that would provide the realm with new and useful products made 
domestically without the need to import.39 
In Venice, as was the case throughout medieval Europe, commerce was 
dominated by guilds.40 Whoever proposed a new technology needed a spe-
cially created power or license, called a privilege, in order to make, sell, or 
use a new invention or would otherwise contravene existing monopolies 
granted in favor of the guilds. The privilege was not necessarily given to an 
individual, but could be thrown open to the public, nor was it necessarily 
given to the inventor or first importer of a new art.41 A number of these pa-
tents were granted, an early example being the famous patent of 1469 grant-
ed to John of Speyer, a German printer, to protect the new art of printing 
that he introduced to the Republic.42 The patent “decreed . . . that for five 
years next following there should be nobody whosoever who would, could, 
might or dare exercise said art of book printing in Venice and its territories, 
except master John himself.”43 The patent referred to the reservation of ex-
clusive rights “[i]n the same manner as usual in other useful arts.”44 For a 
time, patents such as these were issued on a case-by-case basis before a gen-
eral patent law was implemented. 
The application of early patent law in Venice corresponded with the 
height of economic prosperity in the Republic from 1400 to 1550. Venice’s 
economic prosperity and superiority were due to its being a dominant sea 
power in control of the major trade routes.45 That superiority dissolved with 
the discovery of new sea routes to the Far East around the Cape of Good 
 
 39. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, at 855–56; Federico, supra note 
34, at 292. 
 40. See Prager, History of Intellectual Property, supra note 34, at 713. The guilds were a 
group of masters maintaining a monopoly over a particular trade. This control was main-
tained by fixing prices and standards; trading collectively with other groups; defending their 
trade against others, including labourers and foreigners; and providing some security for aged 
and disabled members of the guild. Id. 
 41. Prager, The Early Growth, supra note 34, at 112; Prager, History of Intellectual 
Property, supra note 34, at 714–15. 
 42. Giulio Mandich, Venetian Origins of Inventor’s Rights, 42 J. OF THE PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
378, 381 (1960); Mandich, supra note 38, at 169; Prager, History of Intellectual Property, 
supra note 34, at 715, 750. 
 43. Prager, History of Intellectual Property, supra note 34, at 750. According to Prager, 
this was the first known patent of monopoly preserved in the records of Venice, and there is a 
remark in the patent that it was a usual practice to grant such monopolies. Id. at 715, 750. 
 44. Mandich, supra note 42, at 380; Mandich, supra note 38, at 169; Prager, History of 
Intellectual Property, supra note 34, at 715, 750. 
 45. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 710–11. 
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Hope at the end of the fifteenth century.46 This marked the reversal of migra-
tion of skilled tradesmen and artisans, particularly glass workers, who had in 
the past moved to Venice, but later sought other parts of Europe, taking with 
them knowledge of Venice’s patent custom. Following this migration, the 
use of grants of exclusive rights by governments to encourage inventive 
industry emerged concurrently in several areas in Western Europe in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.47 
The earliest known general patent law is a Venetian statute of 1474 that 
granted a monopoly for ten years to “every person who shall build any new 
and ingenious device.”48 
WE HAVE among us men of great genius, apt to invent and discover in-
genious devices; and in view of the grandeur and virtue of our city, more 
such men come to us every day from divers parts. Now, if provision 
were made for the works and devices discovered by such persons, so that 
others who may see them could not build them and take the inventor’s 
honor away, more men would then apply their genius, would discover, 
and would build devices of great utility and benefit to our common-
wealth. Therefore: BE IT ENACTED that, by the authority of this Coun-
cil, every person who shall build any new and ingenious device in this 
City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give notice of it 
to the office of our General Welfare Board when it has been reduced to 
perfection so that it can be used and operated. It being forbidden to every 
other person in any of our territories and towns to make any further de-
vice conforming with and similar to said one, without the consent and li-
cense of the author, for the term of ten years. And if anybody builds it in 
violation hereof, the aforesaid author and inventor shall be entitled to 
have him summoned before any magistrate the said infringer shall be 
constrained to pay him hundred ducats; and the device shall be destroyed 
at once. It being, however, within the power and discretion of the Gov-
ernment, in its activities, to take and use any such device and instrument, 
with this condition however that no one but the author shall operate it.
49
 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 710–11; Prager, History of Intellectual Property, supra note 34, at 720. 
 48. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 707. While it is generally 
regarded that the custom of granting patents originated in Italy, there is some question as to 
whether the practice began in Venice or Florence. See id. The Republic of Florence allegedly 
issued a patent to the architect and inventor, Filippo Brunelleschi in 1421 for his ship, which 
transported the Carraran marble for the dome of the Florentine Duomo; however, it seems the 
practice was not continued. BRUCE BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND 
COPYRIGHT LAW 17–19 (1967). 
 49. Mandich, supra note 38, at 176–77; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 
34, at 707–09. 
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The Venetian patent statute of 1474 contains the fundamental features 
of today’s patent system.50 It provides an incentive to invent through the 
grant of exclusive rights as an economic tool to encourage technological 
progress by prohibiting free-riding to protect the “inventor’s honor” and 
presumably economic rights.51 It reveals novelty in protecting newly invent-
ed or imported devices not previously known in the city.52 It reveals inven-
tiveness by use of the term “ingenious device.”53 It reveals utility by requir-
ing that a device have “been reduced to perfection so that it can be used and 
operated.”54 It provides a form of patent registration (by giving notice of the 
invention) that provides a limited monopoly of ten years after which the 
device falls into the public domain.55 It reveals an enforcement provision for 
actions against infringers that sets out a fine and provides for delivery and 
destruction of offending articles.56 It demonstrates that the patentee has the 
right to license the patented device but perhaps not to assign it.57 Finally, the 
state is given the option of a compulsory license, with the proviso that “no 
one but the author shall operate it.”58 
As this early Venetian statute specifically provides that rights of exclu-
sivity will be granted to anyone who builds “any new and ingenious device 
in this City,” it is clear that the statute is directed to the development of an 
innovation system focused around the invention (or importation) of new 
physical devices.59 This focus on the need for a physical embodiment in the 
subject matter of a patent was arguably a by-product of the conceptions of 
technology held at the time, rather than perhaps a hard-and-fast rule for pa-
tentability that would last for all of time.  
B. The Early English Patent Custom 
The concepts observed in this early Venetian patent practice were 
adopted in the later English patent practice as a means of encouraging new 
manufacturers to the realm. The origins of modern patent law and the legal 
concepts of invention and patentability lie in the custom of the English 
Crown awarding monopoly rights by letters patent (literally meaning “open 
letters”) in exercise of royal prerogative to produce specific goods or pro-
 
 50. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 709–10. See Prager, History of 
Intellectual Property, supra note 34, at 720; see also BUGBEE, supra note 48, at 24. 
 51. See Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 708. 
 52. See id. at 709. 
 53. See id. at 708–09. 
 54. See id. at 709. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at 709–10. 
 57. See Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 708–09. 
 58. See id. at 709. The statute was characterized as “a considerable success.” Id. at 710. 
 59. See id. at 709. 
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vide specific services.60 Patents at that time were not understood to have the 
precise and technical meaning that they have acquired over the last 200 
years of a grant by the State of monopoly rights to exploit a product or pro-
cess for a limited period. Rather, the early English patent custom reveals 
that letters patent were awarded as a tool of industrial innovation policy de-
signed to bring new trades and industries to the realm by encouraging 
skilled foreign workmen to bring their established trades and settle in Eng-
land.61  
 
C. Patents Under Queen Elizabeth I 
It was not until the reign of Queen Elizabeth I (1558–1603) during the 
middle of the sixteenth century, however, that we find a truly modern patent 
grant, one that involved the Crown issuing letters patent to individuals for 
manufacturing monopolies in accordance with recognized legal principles.62 
From early in her reign, Queen Elizabeth I pursued an innovation policy to 
enable England to attain economic power and strength relative to other 
states by regulating commerce and industry in such a way as to favor the 
creation of new industries and trades. This was to be achieved by stimulat-
ing the domestic production of raw and manufactured goods and encourag-
ing the creation of local industries to manufacture products that would oth-
erwise have been imported, including by luring foreign skilled workers to 
 
 60. Federico, supra note 34, at 292; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, 
at 700–01 (citing William Blackstone, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 316–17 
(1768)) (“The king’s . . . grants, whether of land, honors, liberties, franchises, or aught be-
sides, are contained in charters, or letters patent, that is, open letters, literae patentes: so 
called, because they are not sealed up, but exposed to open view, with the great seal pendant 
at the bottom; and are usually directed or addressed by the king to all his subjects at large.”). 
In contrast to the open letters of letters patent were letters close. Monarchs in England did 
much of the business of the state by means of charters, letters patent, and letters close. Letters 
patent were used to set forth their public directives, whereas letters close were used to pro-
vide private instructions to individuals. Id. 
 61. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 10–11; Schaafsma, supra note 21, at 242; Klitzke, 
supra note 21, at 620–25; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, at 851–52; 
Federico, supra note 34, 292–93. 
 62. D. Seaborne Davies argues that under Elizabeth, in 1561, patent law was introduced 
in England “as a system.” Davies, supra note 34, at 396–97 (“[T]he Patent System was intro-
duced into England as a system in the second year of Elizabeth’s reign”); James Lahore, The 
Legal Rationale of the Patent System, in THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PATENTS IN 
AUSTRALIA 11 (1981). Federico attributes the Elizabethan policy of awarding patents of in-
vention to stimulate the introduction of new industries and trades to a petition made to the 
Queen in 1559 by the Italian, Giacopo Acontio, that he be protected from those who would 
copy certain furnaces and “wheel” machines he had invented. See Federico, supra note 34, at 
296–97. 
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England.63 Elizabeth’s innovation policy focused on introducing new indus-
tries and trades to the realm and avoiding interference with existing indus-
tries and trades and the livelihoods of the established workforce.64 This view 
is substantiated by Lord Coke’s argument against monopolies made at the 
time: 
[A] mans trade is accounted his life, because it maintaineth his life; and 
therefore the monopolist that taketh away a mans trade, taketh away his 
life, and therefore is so much the more odious.
65
 
For Elizabeth, innovation meant bringing new technology to the realm 
(particularly from the Continent), rather than invention as we understand the 
meaning of that term today,66 as patents were granted both to new inventors 
and those who first introduced an invention into the realm through importa-
tion.67 Thus, the early English patent custom reflects mercantilist ideas by 
providing incentives to merchants who had the contacts and the capacity to 
bring new technologies to England.68 
The term “inventor” was used to denote the person importing a new art 
into the realm or the first finder or creator of a new product or process, the 
rights of the inventor being derived from those of the importer.69 Use of the 
phrase “invention and a new trade” was used to mean the importation of a 
new trade or industry, whereas the term “discovery” was used to mean what 
contemporary language describes as an invention, which is the use of in-
ventive mental facility to produce something new and non-obvious.70 
The rule that an inventor included the first importer of patentable ideas 
was laid down in the early case of Edgeberry v. Stephens71 and followed in 
Boulton and Watt v. Bull.72 In Boulton and Watt v. Bull, Chief Justice Eyre 
noted that Edgeberry v. Stephens establishes that “the first introducer of an 
invention practised beyond the sea, shall be deemed the first inventor; and it 
 
 63. FOX, supra note 34, at 61. 
 64. Hulme, History, supra note 34, at 151–52; Hulme, Sequel, supra note 34, at 44; 
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 314–43; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, 
at 855–59; Klitzke, supra note 21, at 622–25; MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 12–13, 18. 
 65. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND CONCERNING HIGH 
TREASON AND OTHER PLEAS OF CROWN AND CRIMINAL CLAUSES 181 (1797). 
 66. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 11 (“Acquisition of superior Continental technology 
was the predominant motive for the issue of patents under the guidance of Elizabeth I’s chief 
minister, William Cecil, later Lord Burghley.”). 
 67. See Edgeberry v. Stephens (1697) 2 Salk. 447 (Eng.); Boulton and Watt v. Bull 
(1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 (Eng.) (following the Edgeberry v. Stephens decision); see also Moser v. 
Marsden (1893) R.P.C. 350 at 350–51 (Eng.) 
 68. Hulme, History, supra note 34, at 151–52. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 151–53, 280–81. 
 71. (1697) 2 Salk. 447 (Eng.). 
 72. (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 (Eng.). 
2016] EARLY HISTORY OF PATENT LAW 187 
is there said the act is intended to encourage new devices useful to the king-
dom and whether acquired by travel or study, it is the same thing.”73 
Encouraging entrepreneurs to assume the costs and risks associated 
with introducing a new industry or trade required a powerful incentive in the 
form of the potential to earn a substantial economic return without causing 
substantial costs to be incurred by the Crown.74 Thus, patents were not 
awarded in recognition of some natural right in favor of an inventor to con-
trol the use of his or her ideas.75 Instead, monopolies were primarily granted 
for the importation of new industries, and many were given to aliens or nat-
uralized subjects of the Crown.76 
While many of the grants made under the exercise of royal prerogative 
by Elizabeth I and her successor to the throne, James I, were genuinely in-
tended to encourage new and useful arts,77 many were said to be an abuse of 
that power to reward royal favorites.78 It was alleged that the Crown granted 
monopolies for the making or importing of products regardless of whether 
the patentee was the inventor or had brought a new product into the realm.79 
Often these monopolies were granted in relation to commodities already in 
use. Sometimes monopolies were created over necessities such as salt, 
starch, saltpetre, paper, and glass, thereby harming the existing trade in 
known commodities.80 According to one commentator, “[t]he financial re-
turns to the Crown were at the most negligible, and, while it may be admit-
ted that fiscal policy and the hope of raising revenue were contributing fac-
tors, they were not the main nor even an important motivating force.”81 Oth-
ers have argued that the complaints against the patent system “were a result 
of a decline in prosperity in the last decade of the sixteenth century, and the 
first impulse was to seek redress from real or imaginary abuses” including 
the grant of monopolies.82 
 
 73. Id. at 491. 
 74. See Marsden v. Saville Street Co. (1878) L.R. Exch. 203 at 206 (Eng.); Plimpton v. 
Malcolmson (1876) Ch.D. 531 at 555–56 (Eng.); In re Wirth’s Patent (1879) Ch.D. 303 at 
304 (Eng.); In re Avery’s Patent (1887) Ch.D. 307 at 316–17 (Eng.). 
 75. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 53; Mossoff, supra note 34, at 1256–57. 
 76. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 11; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, 
at 855–57; Hulme, History, supra note 34, at 151–52. 
 77. Schaafsma, supra note 21, at 245. 
 78. BUGBEE, supra note 48, at 36–37; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 346–47; 
Schaafsma, supra note 21, at 245; Lahore, supra note 62, at 11; Federico, supra note 34, at 
299. 
 79. BUGBEE, supra note 48, at 36–37; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 346–47; 
Schaafsma, supra note 21, at 245; Lahore, supra note 62, at 11; Federico, supra note 34, at 
299. 
 80. BUGBEE, supra note 48, at 36–37. 
 81. FOX, supra note 34, at 188. 
 82. Chris Dent, Patent Policy in Early Modern England: Jobs, Trade and Regulation, 10 
AUSTL. J. LEGAL HIST. 71, 75 (2006). 
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Outrage over the Crown’s perceived abuses was expressed in 1601 dur-
ing Elizabeth’s last Parliament. The struggle that ensued between Parliament 
and the Queen was one of the most significant in English constitutional his-
tory. At stake were the royal prerogative and its preeminence over the power 
of Parliament. The struggle was temporarily stayed when Elizabeth I issued 
a proclamation in Parliament that revoked a great number of objectionable 
patents and gave the common law courts the power to determine the validity 
of monopolies granted by the Crown.83 Her Majesty thereby abandoned her 
claim to settle disputes arising from the grant privileges under the royal pre-
rogative and even showed indignation that she had been tricked into making 
such grants.84 
That, however, was not the end of the matter, as the common law was 
soon called upon to address the issue. It was the grant to a groom of Queen 
Elizabeth’s Privy Chamber, Edward Darcy, that led to the first common law 
judicial decision to challenge the nature of the Crown’s power to grant mo-
nopolies and the nature and power of the royal prerogative.85 The case was 
Darcy v. Allen (also known as The Case on Monopolies).86 
Darcy v. Allen involved the grant of an exclusive right issued in 1598 
to Edward Darcy to manufacture, import, and sell playing cards in England 
and its dominions, even though the manufacture of playing cards was an 
established industry.87 When Allen, a London haberdasher, infringed the 
patent, Darcy brought suit.88 Allen admitted selling the cards, but pleaded a 
right to do so.89 It was argued on behalf of the patentee that the Crown had 
the sole prerogative in matters of pleasure and recreation and that the grant 
had been given to control the number of playing cards in circulation and the 
time spent by servants and apprentices playing cards.90 The King’s Bench 
decided the case in the Easter term of 1603 after the Queen’s death in 
 
 83. BUGBEE, supra note 48, at 37. 
 84. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 348–49; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra 
note 34, at 866–67. 
 85. Jacob I. Corré, The Argument, Decision, and Reports of Darcy v. Allen, 45 EMORY L. 
J. 1261, 1261 (1996). 
 86. Id. at 1261–62 (“Darcy v. Allen’s fame is largely due to the reports of Edward 
Coke.”). Coke appeared as Attorney General before the Kings Bench in Darcy v. Allen, was 
one of the reporters of the case, and was involved in drafting of the Statute of Monopolies. Id. 
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at 1261, n.1. 
 87. Corré, supra note 85, at 1261. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1272–73. 
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1602.91 A verdict against Edward Darcy in favor of the defendant, Allen, 
was given.92 
No written opinions were given, and in the absence of reasons, coun-
sel’s argument for the defense was reported in full and is regarded as being 
representative of the court’s reasoning.93 The case report reveals that, as a 
rule, monopolies were stated to be generally contrary to law because they do 
not benefit the realm, they raise prices, and they reduce the merchantability 
of goods and reduce employment.94 
However, the defendant’s argument expressed one exception to the rule 
against monopolies that has become a classic principle. That exception was 
made in favor of monopolies for invention and importation, limited in dura-
tion: 
[W]hen any man by his own charge and industry, or by his own wit and 
invention doth bring any new trade into the realm, or any engine tending 
to the furtherance of a trade that never was used before; and that for the 
good of the realm;—in such cases the king may grant to him a monopo-
ly-patent for some reasonable time, until the subjects may learn the 
same, in consideration of the good he doth bring by his invention to the 
commonwealth, otherwise not.
95
 
These arguments reflect the common law principles relating to monop-
olies and have formed the basis of patent systems in England, its dominions, 
the United States, and many other foreign states.96 
The Clothworkers of Ipswich, decided in 1615, was the second im-
portant case decided before the passing of the Statute of Monopolies. 97 The 
case involved a claim made by a group of tailors incorporated and chartered 
by King James I to conduct their business in Ipswich against a tailor who 
was not part of the corporation but practiced his trade in the town.98 The 
court stated that the Crown could create corporations with power to make 
ordinances governing trade, but the power granted did not extend to the cre-
ation of a monopoly harmful to free trade: 
[I]t was agreed by the Court, that the King might make corporations . . . 
but thereby they cannot make a monopoly for that is to take away free-
trade, which is the birthright of every subject. . . . But if a man hath 
 
 91. Id. at 1267. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Corré, supra note 85, at 1267–72. 
 94. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, at 868. 
 95. Federico, supra note 34, at 301; Lahore, supra note 62, at 12. 
 96. Lahore, supra note 62, at 11–12. 
 97. (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147. (The case is otherwise known as The Case of the Taylors 
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 98. Id. at 147–48. 
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brought in a new invention and a new trade within the kingdom, in peril 
of his life, and consumption of his estate or stock, &c. or if a man hath 
made a new discovery of any thing, in such cases the King of his grace 
and favor, in recompence of his costs and travail, may grant by charter 
unto him, that he only shall use such a trade or trafique for a certain time, 
because at first the people of the kingdom are ignorant, and have not the 
knowledge or skill to use it: but when that patent is expired, the King 
cannot make a new grant thereof: for when the trade is become common, 
and others have been bound apprentices in the same trade, there is no 
reason that such should be forbidden to use it.
99
 
The judgment contains all the conditions necessary for the grant of let-
ters patent in the mid sixteenth century: the justification for the monopoly is 
that new industries are introduced into the realm and that no monopoly can 
issue for preexisting industries; the monopoly rewards the labor and costs of 
the inventor; the patentee is to train Englishmen in the trade; and that patents 
are royal grants of privilege given solely for the purpose of achieving policy 
objectives based upon the common good.100 
D. The Statute of Monopolies 
James I, who succeeded Elizabeth in 1603 shortly before Darcy v. Al-
len was decided, was caught in the same struggle on the question of monop-
olies as his predecessor. His needs and those of his courtiers demanded that 
patents be freely granted, while Parliament, in contrast, demanded their reg-
ulation. Notwithstanding the outcome in Darcy v. Allen, James continued 
issuing odious monopolies over existing trades and products. In the face of 
continuing political pressure, James issued in 1610 a “Declaration of His 
Majesty’s Pleasure,” which became known as the Book of Bounty, which is 
said to have provided a statement acknowledging the common law princi-
ples arising from the reports in Darcy v. Allen.101 
Shortly thereafter, in May 1624, Parliament enacted the Statute of Mo-
nopolies.102 The Statute of Monopolies reflected the common law’s suspi-
cion of monopolies but recognized nonetheless that monopolies limited in 
duration have the potential to serve the public interest by providing an in-
centive to invent. The principal purpose of the Statute of Monopolies was to 
 
 99. Id. at 252–53. 
 100. Mossoff, supra note 34, at 1270. 
 101. FOX, supra note 34, at 96–97. 
 102. 1623, 21 Ja. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Ja1/21/3/contents. 
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declare all grants of monopolies void, other than patents for invention, 
which it allowed for a limited duration.103 
From a constitutional perspective, the Statute of Monopolies represents 
an incredible assertion of parliamentary power and an assertion that the 
Kingdom was to be ruled by common law, rather than royal prerogative. 
The object of passing the Statute of Monopolies is said to be the curtailment 
of the practice of the Crown in granting monopolies to court favorites in 
goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by the public, a 
practice considered to be contrary to the common law.104 Thus, the Statute of 
Monopolies was little more than a declaration of the common law principles 
then in existence with the exceptions that it fixed a maximum term of four-
teen years and transferred jurisdiction for hearing patent disputes from the 
Exchequer to the common law courts.105 
Section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies sets out the exception in favor 
of patents for invention and the conditions to be satisfied in order for a pa-
tent to be granted: 
[Monopolies] shall not extend to any tres Patents and Graunt of Privilege 
for the tearme of fowerteene yeares or under, hereafter to be made of the 
sole working or makinge of any manner of new Manufactures within this 
Realme, to the true and first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufac-
tures, which others at the tyme of makinge such tres Patents and Graunts 
shall not use, soe as alsoe they be not contrary to the Lawe nor mischie-
vous to the State, by raisinge prices of Commodities at home, or hurt of 
Trade, or generallie inconvenient . . . .
106
 
The Statute of Monopolies, by making reference to a “grant of privi-
lege,” did not change the position at law of applicants, who did not have a 
right to be granted a patent and were not granted property rights but were in 
the position of a petitioner seeking the monarch’s favor. Likewise, the words 
“true and first inventor” referred to the person responsible for the introduc-
 
 103. Id. at § 1. The Statute of Monopolies provides that the central objective of the statute 
is to encourage free trade and competition by rendering void all monopolies, including those 
granted under the authority of letters patent. Section 1 provides: “All [Monapolies] and all 
Commissions Graunts Licences Charters and tres patents heretofore made or graunted or 
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whatsoever of or for the sole buyinge sellinge markinge workinge or usinge of any thinge 
within this Realme . . . are altogether contrary to the Lawes of this Realme, and so are and 
shalbe utterlie void and of none effecte.” Id. 
 104. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
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tion of the invention into England. Coke, writing contemporaneously, ex-
plained the reasoning behind the sort of monopoly permitted by section 6 of 
the Statute of Monopolies as being “because the inventor bringeth to and for 
the Commonwealth a new manufacture by his invention, cost and charges, 
and therefore it is reason, that he should have a privilege for his reward (and 
the encouragement of others in the like) for a convenient time.”107 Here we 
have a contemporaneous statement of one involved in the drafting and pas-
sage of the Act that describes the incentive function of patent law. In fact, it 
is clear that even from these early times there was an inextricable link be-
tween offerings of rewards and incentives to bring new inventions to the 
realm. 
According to law set out in Darcy v. Allen, patents could only be inval-
idated if they were generally inconvenient for interfering with established 
industries and trades.108 These requirements were adopted in the language of 
the Statute of Monopolies. The Statute of Monopolies did not narrow or 
eliminate categories of eligible subject matter. It only addressed patent 
abuses by prohibiting the grant of odious monopolies over known trades. In 
doing so, it left the existing common law intact.109 
The focus of the Statute of Monopolies is thus on ensuring that patents 
are only issued for new trades that had not in recent times been practiced in 
the realm at the time the patent was applied for.110 This is seen in the subject 
matter requirement that a monopoly could only be granted in respect of “any 
manner of new Manufactures” for the reason that a monopoly in respect of a 
new industry or trade would not be, in the words of section 6, “contrary to 
the Lawe nor mischievous to the State, by raising prices of Commodities at 
home, or hurt of Trade, or generallie inconvenient.”111 
The wording of section 6 also contains an implicit reference to utility, 
in the form of a requirement that the claimed invention be capable of being 
performed (or that it work).112 While the more modern and additional stric-
tures of patentability in the form of a requirement of inventiveness and a 
requirement that the applicant describe the subject matter of the patent in a 
written patent specification would come later, the wording of the section and 
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contemporaneous documents that described its operation make no reference 
to categorical subject matter exclusions. 113 
Therefore, it cannot be said that the Statute of Monopolies restricts the 
kinds of new processes that can be patentable today merely because it out-
lawed patents on non-novel businesses in England. As such, business meth-
ods, non-physical methods, or methods of organizing human activity were 
not removed from the scope of patentability by the passing of the Statute of 
Monopolies.114 
The Statute of Monopolies governed English patent law for more than 
200 years, and it was not until the passing of the Patent Law Amendment Act 
1852 (UK) that England received significant patent law legislation. The 
Statute of Monopolies, however, continued to be of relevance as it was 
never repealed and, by reference, expressly formed the basis of the pat-
entable subject matter standard in United Kingdom patent law statutes until 
1977 when the United Kingdom abandoned its Statute of Monopolies-based 
regime in favor of a patent system based on the European Patent Conven-
tion.115 
E. Disclosure of the Invention: Consideration for a Patent 
In patent law’s infancy, the consideration required for the grant of a pa-
tent was the creation of a new industry or device and knowledge given to the 
public by the establishment of an industry in the realm or by training ap-
prentices who would later be able to work the trade or industry under the 
patentee or independently on the expiration of the patent. Patents were not 
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required to contain a description of the invention, either in writing or dia-
grammatic form.116 
While the Statute of Monopolies makes no demand for a disclosure of 
the invention in writing, a few of the early seventeenth century patents con-
tained a specification made by the patentee, for the patentee’s benefit, to 
clarify the scope of the monopoly. Soon a custom of presenting a detailed 
description of the invention in a specification arose, before being mandated 
by the courts by the middle of the eighteenth century.117 The need for a writ-
ten specification accompanying the patent application was recognized at 
common law in 1778 in Liardet v. Johnson, where Lord Justice Mansfield 
directed the jury: 
The third point is whether the specification is such as instructs others to 
make it. For the condition of giving encouragement is this: that you must 
specify upon record your invention in such a way as shall teach an artist, 
when your term is out, to make it—and to make it as well as you by your 
directions; for then at the end of the term, the public have the benefit of it. 
The inventor has the benefit during the term, and the public have the benefit 
after.118 
By the end of the eighteenth century, it had become settled law that the 
consideration for the patent was not the working of the invention per se, but 
the disclosure of how to make and use the invention.119 In Boulton and Watt 
v. Bull, Justice Buller declared that “[t]he specification is the price which the 
patentee is to pay for the monopoly.”120 Consequently, the utility require-
ment evolved from the question of whether the invention was capable of 
successful introduction in the realm to whether it could be worked in the 
manner and so as to achieve the results described in the specification.121 
The decision in Liardet v. Johnson was also instructive on the need for 
an invention to be novel and what that requirement entailed. According to 
Lord Mansfield, an allegation of want of novelty had to “be supported either 
 
 116. See Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 2), supra note 34, at 860; Hulme, History of 
Patent Law, supra note 34, at 285. 
 117. See Federico, supra note 34, at 304; see also Hulme, History of Patent Law, supra 
note 34, at 285. 
 118. See Federico, supra note 34, at 304; Hulme, History of Patent Law, supra note 34, at 
285. 
 119. Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 3), supra note 34, at 801; Hulme, History of Patent 
Law, supra note 34, at 287. 
 120. Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 472 (Eng.). The judgment of Lord 
Chief Justice Eyre also stated that “[t]he modern cases have chiefly turned upon the specifica-
tions, whether there was a fair disclosure.” Id. at 491. 
 121. Turner v. Winter (1787) 1 T. R. 601 at 604 (Eng.); The King v. Arkwright (1785) 1 
Web. Pat. Cas. 64 at 66 (Eng.); Morgan v. Seaward (1837) 2 M. & W. 544 at 548 (Eng.); 
Liardet v. Johnson (1870) 1 Y. & C.C.C. 526 at 528 (Eng.); Hill v. Thompson (1818) 8 
Taunt. 373 at 387 (Eng.); Lewis v. Marling (1829) 4 Car. & P. 53 at 55. 
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by proof of continuous and successful prior use of the invention” or proof 
“that the subject matter of the invention was common knowledge in the 
trade”.122 
F. Uncertainty Regarding Processes During the Industrial Revolution 
Identifying a historically consistent view of the objects of the patent 
system is difficult due to the state of uncertainty that existed within English 
patent law until the mid nineteenth century. It is reported that 150 years after 
the Statute of Monopolies was enacted, the English patent registers were 
brimming with patents claiming processes, even though it was not clear 
whether these were patentable.123 
One of the first judicial actions involving the scope of patentable sub-
ject matter was the 1795 decision of Boulton and Watt v. Bull. As patents 
were not litigated in the common law courts until the Privy Council author-
ized such suits in 1752, judicial interpretation of various aspects of patent 
law were essentially absent until Boulton and Watt v. Bull was handed 
down.124 This lack of judicial guidance as to the scope and content of the 
notion of “manufacture” was acknowledged by Chief Justice Eyre who said, 
“Patent rights are no where, that I can find, accurately described in our 
books.”125 
At issue was the validity of patent in respect to a new method of using 
an existing steam engine devised by James Watt, which lessened steam and 
fuel consumption.126 Watt’s improvement was to have the condenser in a 
separate vessel from the steam cylinder. The method was described in the 
 
 122. Hulme, History of Patent Law, supra note 34, at 287. 
 123. Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 494–95 (Eng.) (“Probably I do not 
over-rate it when I state that two-thirds, I believe I might say three-fourths, of all patents 
granted since the statute passed, are for methods of operating and of manufacturing, produc-
ing no new substances and employing no new machinery.”); Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 
2), supra note 34, at 856 (“As one of the earliest texts on the patent law stated in 1806: ‘most 
of the patents now taken out, are by name, for the method of doing particular things . . . ‘”.). 
 124. MACLEOD, supra note 34, at 61; See also Mossoff, supra note 34, at 1262–63, n.26. 
According to Mossoff, the prerogative court of Privy Council was invested with jurisdiction 
to heard patent disputes as early as 1562. Id. Mossoff further records that Privy Council di-
vested to the law courts jurisdiction over determining the validity of patents for inventions; 
thus putting into effect, albeit 130 years late, section 2 of the Statute of Monopolies. Id. at 
1285. 
 125. See Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 491 (Eng.); See also Wood v. 
Zimmer (1815) Eng. Rep. 58 at 61 (Eng.) (“The subject of patents for new inventions has not 
been treated with due precision, as a branch of law by itself, in any of our law books. It is 
only indeed within a few years that they have become so important a part of our commercial 
machinery.”). 
 126. See Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 463–64, 495–96 (Eng.). 
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specification as the application of certain principles of nature in a way to 
achieve its purpose.127 
The bench of four was equally divided as to the patent’s validity. Chief 
Justice Eyre and Justice Rooke held the patent to be valid, while Justices 
Heath and Buller took the opposite view. For Justices Heath and Buller, it 
was the presence of a physical substance or object that was the basis of an 
invention being something other than an unpatentable abstract principle.128 
In contrast, Chief Justice Eyre considered that the expression “any manner 
of new manufacture” used in the Statute of Monopolies bore a much wider 
meaning.129 
While each of the judges agreed that there can be no patent for a mere 
principle, there were differences of opinion as to what this means. Chief 
Justice Eyre described a principle as being an “abstract notion,” as distinct 
from a “practical manner of doing,” while for Justices Rooke and Buller, it 
was an elementary truth of the arts and sciences.130 Justice Heath was alone 
in taking the view that the prohibition on patenting principles extends to 
preclude patenting methods of production and even patents on the applica-
tion of a principle.131 
The involvement of some physical substance was for Justices Heath 
and Buller the basis for determining whether a claimed invention is some-
thing more than a mere principle. According to Justice Heath, the term 
“manufacture” is reducible to two physical classes: vendible machines or 
(chemical) substances.132 Justice Heath took the view that, unless the method 
resulted in a vendible machine or substance, the method was not patentable, 
and if it did so result, the patent would be for the vendible machine or sub-
stance and not for the method.133 He opined that “patents for chemical pro-
cesses” are in truth “for a vendible substance.”134 Justice Buller took the 
same view, stating that the scope of patentable subject matter extends only 
as far as inventions embodied in mechanical and chemical forms.135 
In contrast, Chief Justice Eyre made clear that he did not favor a physi-
cality requirement. He held that new manufactures are things made, the 
practice of making (thereby endorsing the patentability of processes), and 
principles reduced to practice in a new manner (thereby endorsing the pa-
 
 127. Id. at 496. 
 128. Id. at 483, 485–86. 
 129. Id. at 492–96. 
 130. Id. at 478, 486, 495–96. 
 131. Id. at 482–83. 
 132. See Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 481–82 (Eng.). 
 133. Id. at 482. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 485–86. 
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tentability of non-physical processes).136 Justice Eyre described “the practice 
of making” broadly as to include “any art producing effects useful to the 
public.”137 Chief Justice Eyre noted that a patent for a method involving no 
new mechanism and producing no new result would necessarily be for the 
method itself, that is, for the “method detached from all physical existence 
whatever.”138 
Both the Chief Justice and Justice Rooke indicated that patent eligibil-
ity turns on a principle being reduced to a specific practical application ca-
pable of producing effects that are of benefit to the public.139 This is a posi-
tion that is as true today as it was then and leaves open the possibility that 
non-physical inventions have been recognized as being patentable since the 
earliest judicial consideration of the subject matter eligibility standard. 
Justice Rooke saw no difficulty with process patents or patents to im-
provements on existing technologies.140 He allowed the patent by focusing 
on the mechanical nature of the improvement, having determined that the 
invention claimed is more than a mere principle. Rather, Justice Rooke con-
sidered the claimed invention to be a principle reduced to a practical appli-
cation.141 He said nothing to indicate that producing a physical effect or 
causing a physical transformation of matter is what distinguishes the ab-
stract from the non-abstract. 
When James Watt’s steam engine patent was re-litigated in an action 
on the case four years later in Hornblower v. Boulton, the court unanimously 
upheld the patent and confirmed the reasons and decision of Chief Justice 
Eyre, rejecting any assertion that the patent claimed a philosophical princi-
ple.142 In that case, Chief Justice Kenyon broadly described the concept of 
manufacture as pertaining to, or the equivalent of “something made by the 
hands of man.”143 Justice Grose was of a similar view finding that the patent 
was “not a patent for a mere principle, but for the working and making of a 
new manufacture within the words and meaning of the statute.”144 
 
 136. Id. at 492–93. 
 137. Id. at 492. 
 138. See Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 494 (Eng.). 
 139. Id. at 477–78, 496–97. 
 140. Id. at 478–79. 
 141. Id. at 479–80. 
 142. (1799) 8 T. R. 95 at 98 (Eng.). 
 143. Id. at 99 (“But having now heard everything that can be said on the subject, I have 
no doubt in saying that this is a patent for a manufacture, which I understand to be something 
made by the hands of man.”). 
 144. Id. at 101. Watt’s steam engine patent was extended for 25 years by an Act of Par-
liament in 1775 by 15 Geo. III c. 61: An Act for vesting in James Watt, engineer, his execu-
tors, administrators, and assigns, the sole use and property of certain steam engines, common-
ly called fire engines, of his invention, described in the said Act throughout His Majesty’s 
dominions, for a limited time. 
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The distinction between patentable manufactures and unpatentable 
principles made in Boulton and Watt v. Bull and Hornblower v. Boulton was 
confirmed in The King v. Wheeler, a case that concerned a method of drying 
and preparing malt that involved no new machine.145 While the patent was 
declared void because the specification did not adequately describe the 
claimed invention, Chief Justice Abbott gave some consideration to the con-
cept of manufacture: 
Now the word ‘manufactures’ has been generally understood to denote 
either a thing made, which is useful for its own sake, and vendible as 
such, as a medicine, a stove, a telescope, and many others, or to mean an 
engine or instrument, or some part of an engine or instrument, to be em-
ployed, either in the making of some previously known article, or in 
some other useful purpose, as a stocking frame, or a steam engine for 
raising water for mines. Or it may perhaps extend also to a new process 
to be carried on by known implements, or elements, acting upon known 
substances, and ultimately producing some other known substance, but 
producing it in a cheaper or more expeditious manner, or of a better and 
more useful kind. But no merely philosophical or abstract principle can 
answer to the word ‘manufactures’. Something of a corporeal and sub-
stantial nature, something that can be made by man from the matters sub-
jected to his art and skill, or at the least some new mode of employing 
practically his art and skill, is requisite to satisfy this word.
146
 
From three distinct exemplars of patentable subject matter identified in 
the final sentence of this excerpt, it is clear Chief Justice Abbott considered 
the distinction between patentable subject matter and an unpatentable philo-
sophical or abstract principle as involving something other than a physicali-
ty requirement. 
Despite the differences of opinion they contain, the enduring effect of 
Boulton and Watt v. Bull, Hornblower v. Boulton, and The King v. Wheeler 
is the idea that there is no place for a physicality requirement in the scope of 
patentable subject matter and that a lack of physical embodiment in an in-
vention is not to be equated with a claimed invention being a mere abstract 
or philosophical principle. 
At the time, though, the differences in opinion in those cases led to un-
certainty as to what the scope of patentable subject matter in England was. 
That uncertainty is evident in the choices made by the founders of the Unit-
ed States patent system. 
 
 145. (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 345 at 345 (Eng.). 
 146. The King v. Wheeler, (1819) 2 B. & Ald. 345 at 349–52 (Eng.). 
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G. The Emergence of Patent Law in the United States 
Shortly after gaining independence, the United States established its 
own national patent regime, independent of the early English patent tradition 
and the Statute of Monopolies. The first United States Federal Patent Act, 
the Act of 1790, was largely based on and incorporated features of the Eng-
lish system.147 Justice Story, in Pennock v. Dialogue, acknowledged the in-
fluence of the English practice on these early patent laws: 
It is obvious to the careful inquirer, that many of the provisions of our 
patent act are derived from the principles and practice which have pre-
vailed in the construction of that of England. . . . The language of [the 
patent clause of the Statute of Monopolies] is not, as we shall presently 
see, identical with ours; but the construction of it adopted by the English 
courts, and the principles and practice which have long regulated the 
grants of their patents, as they must have been known and are tacitly re-
ferred to in some of the provisions of our own statute, afford materials to 
illustrate it.
148
 
Against the backdrop of the English system, the Framers of the United 
States Constitution, at the end of the eighteenth century, explicitly tied pa-
tentability to the purpose of advancing “useful arts.”149 In pursuance of this 
objective the Constitution of the United States authorized the United States 
Congress to grant exclusive rights to “Inventors” in respect of their “Dis-
coveries.”150 The United States Congress has legislative power to make laws 
with respect to patents by virtue of the “intellectual property clause” in the, 
Constitution of the United States, which empowers the Congress: 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respec-
tive Writings and Discoveries.
151
 
One of the reasons for this departure from “manufactures” in favor of 
the “useful arts” was the view that “even in Great Britain the phrase ‘new 
 
 147. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (noting that first 
patent statute was written against the backdrop of English monopoly practices); Walterscheid, 
Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 698. 
 148. 27 U.S. 1, 18 (1829). 
 149. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 976–77 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943,985–89 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Walterscheid, Science and Useful Arts, supra note 34, at 12–13, 
33–36; George Ramsey, The Historical Background of Patents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 6, 6 
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patent system in the Venetian Republic in 1474. See generally Mandich, supra note 38; 
Mandich, supra note 42. 
 150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 151. Id. 
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manufactures’ was unduly limiting for a patent system because it seemed to 
exclude new processes.”152 
The United States Congress passed its first patent statute in 1790 and 
its second in 1793. The first patent statute in 1790 was largely based on and 
incorporated features of the English patent system, as was the 1793 Act.153 
Patents under the 1790 Act were granted by the executive rather than by 
Acts enacted by the legislative branch. The four enumerated categories of 
patentable subject matter established by the 1793 Act (art, machine, manu-
facture, and composition of matter) remained essentially unchanged until 
1952, when Congress amended § 101 by replacing the word “art” with “pro-
cess” and defining that term in § 100 (b).154 The Supreme Court has made 
clear that this change did not alter the substance of the statute; it did not 
broaden the scope of patentable subject matter.155 
Both the 1790 and the 1793 Acts adopted a fourteen-year patent term 
and required the inventor to file a written specification describing the inven-
tion claimed.156 However, in the United States the patent right has never 
been predicated upon importation and has never been limited to “manufac-
tures.”157 
In the United States it is the language of Congress that dictates what is 
patentable, rather than history or the common law of England.158 As the Su-
preme Court noted in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, “[O]ur obligation is to take 
 
 152. Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 53–54 (1949). 
 153. See Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 698. This is reflected in 
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panying Proposed Amendments to HR 41. Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 
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 154. Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323 (1793); Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 
Stat. 797 (1952). 
 155. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182–83 (1981). 
 156. Patent Act of 1793 § 1. 
 157. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 58–59 (1824) (discussing that patents are not 
awarded in the United States to someone who is not an “inventor,” excluding importers); 
Prager, Historical Background, supra note 34, at 309; Klitzke, supra note 21, at 638 (stating 
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 158. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
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statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity appears, by the legislative 
history and statutory purpose.”159 
Given that the Framers did not use the word “manufacture” in the Con-
stitution to describe the subject matter of patents as they might have done 
had they intended to merely incorporate the English law as it was at that 
time, it is conceivable, although there is no real evidence for this, that the 
Framers intended the reference to “useful arts” to signal an expansive scope 
of patentable subject matter to remove the uncertainty that surrounded the 
scope of patent protection offered in England in relation to the patentability 
of processes.160 
The four enumerated categories of patentable subject matter found in 
United States patent legislation shows a deliberate choice between compet-
ing views prevalent in England at the time of their adoption in the 1793 Pa-
tent Act; these four categories were either drawn from the Statute of Mo-
nopolies and the common law refinement of its interpretation or were in-
tended to resolve competing views in England at the time.161 
Arguably, the inclusion of the category of “manufacture” in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101 manifests an intention to incorporate into United States practice as 
much of the common law interpretation of “new manufactures” as was then 
understood but not to limit the scope of patentable subject matter in the 
United States to that which could be patented in England. It would appear 
that the inclusion by Congress of any “art” or “process” in the patent system 
was a deliberate clarification of the English practice, confirming the patent-
ability of methods.162 
 
 159. Id. at 315. 
 160. Lutz, supra note 152, at 53–54. As noted above, this uncertainty stems from the fact 
that judicial interpretations of various aspects of patent law were virtually absent from the 
common law in England until after the Privy Council finally authorized patent suits to be 
heard in the common law courts in 1752 and the first case involving questions about the 
scope of patentable subject matter was not resolved until Boulton and Watt v. Bull was hand-
ed down in 1795. See supra Part F. 
 161. See Walterscheid, American Patent Law (Part 1), supra note 34, at 67–71. 
 162. The 1793 Act explicitly included “any new and useful art,” in the list of categories 
of patentable subject matter, a usage that was carried forward until “art” was replaced with 
“process” in 35 U.S.C. §101 and defined in §100(b) in 1952. See Patent Act of 1793 § 1; Act 
of July 19, 1952, § 100. The inclusion of any “art” or “process” appears to have been a delib-
erate clarification of a question then unresolved in English law as to whether a process or an 
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was likely given that the case came before the Chief Justice at sittings after Trinity term (the 
term beginning after Easter) in 1793. See Boulton and Watt v. Bull (1795) 2 H. Bl. 463 at 464 
(Eng.). Thus, it would appear that Congress broadened the field of patent eligibility from 
“new manufactures” to “useful arts” to avoid the possible complication that the English 
phrase was unduly limited. Lutz, supra note 152, at 153–54. 
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Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. The first is that the 
English patenting practice that preceded the establishment of a United States 
patent system is of relevance. The second is that the scope of patentable 
subject matter in the United States ought not be narrower than that in Eng-
land at the time the United States patent system came into being. 
H. Emergence of the Inventive Step Requirement 
Of the contemporary requirements of patentability,163 only novelty (in 
the sense of prior use rather than prior publication) was recognized in Eng-
land prior to 1623.164 Obviousness (or lack of an inventive step) was not 
clearly recognized as a separate ground of invalidity until late in the nine-
teenth century, and the clear distinctions drawn today between lack of nov-
elty, obviousness and lack of subject matter in a claimed invention were not 
fully developed in the case law as it stood in 1900.165 As the High Court of 
Australia noted in National Research Development Corporation v. Commis-
sioner of Patents, although the Statute of Monopolies had spoken of “any 
manner of new manufactures within this realme” and of “the true and first 
inventor and inventors of such manufactures,” it nowhere spoke of “the in-
vention.”166 
The term “inventive step” appears first to have been used by Lord 
Justce Fletcher Moulton in 1908 in the course of his Lordship’s judgment in 
the English case of British United Shoe Machinery Company Ltd. v. A. 
Fussell & Sons Ltd., a case dealing with a challenge to the novelty of a 
claimed new combination of known integers, and thus cannot be traced back 
to the Statute of Monopolies.167 In 1894, Master of the Rolls Lord Esher 
responded in The Edison Bell Phonograph Corporation v. Smith and Young 
to a submission that one of the claims of the patent in suit was wanting in 
subject matter: 
 
 163. The contemporary requirements of patentability are that an invention must fall with-
in one or more of the four categories of patentable subject matter enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 
101, be novel, be non-obvious, and be useful. See supra note7. The invention claimed must 
also be described in sufficient detail and enabled so that one with ordinary skill in the subject 
matter of the patent can make and use the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2015). 
 164. Although the 1474 Venetian patent statute required that an invention be “ingenious,” 
indicating a need for inventiveness, this requirement does not seem to have been imported 
into English patent law until much later. See Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 3), supra note 
34, at 800; Walterscheid, Antecedents (Part 1), supra note 34, at 707. 
 165. R D Werner & Co Inc v Bailey Aluminium Products Pty Ltd (1989) 25 FCR 565 at 
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 166. (1959) 102 CLR 252, 268–69 (Austl.) 
 167. (1908) 25 R.P.C. 631 at 653 (Eng.). 
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Now, whenever I hear the objection taken to a patent which has been 
used, which has been bought and sold, which has been therefore treated 
by men of business as a useful thing, that it is wanting in subject-matter, 
I look upon it, I confess, with an amused contempt. . . . It really comes to 
this, that although the invention is new—that is, that nobody has thought 
of it before—and although it is useful, yet, when you consider it, you 
come to the conclusion that it is so easy, so palpable, that everybody who 
thought for a moment would come to the same conclusion; or, in more 
homely language, hardly judicial, but rather businesslike, it comes to 
this, it is so easy that any fool could do it. Well, I look, as I say, upon 
that objection, when all others have failed, generally with amused con-
tempt.
168
 
It was not until the enactment of the Patents and Designs Act of 1907 
that a statutory distinction was drawn between novelty and obviousness in 
the United Kingdom. It was not until The Patent Act of 1952 that the United 
States169 and Australia followed suit.170 The High Court of Australia has ex-
plained that “raising the threshold of inventiveness” in this way was appro-
priate to balance inventors’ need for encouragement with the public’s need 
to access information:171 
The emergence of the independent requirement for an inventive step, 
first in case law, then in legislative requirements for patentability as oc-
curred in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, has al-
ways reflected the balance of policy considerations in patent law of en-
couraging and rewarding inventors without impeding advances and im-
provements by skilled, non-inventive persons.
172
 
 
 168. (1894) 11 R.P.C. 389 at 398. 
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III. CONSIDERATION OF PHYSICALITY IN PATENT LAW’S HISTORY 
From its earliest days, the commercial and technical innovation re-
quirements of the patent system have been about giving the public access to 
new technologies. The history of the patent system reveals a 500-year-old 
innovation policy dating back to the Venetian Republic designed to promote 
innovation, prosperity, employment, and knowledge transfer. 
While the Venetian patent statute of 1474 makes explicit reference to 
the introduction of new devices, the pre-Statute of Monopolies practice of 
issuing patents demonstrates nothing that ties the patent incentive to physi-
cal creations. Rather, we see an incentive to introduce new industries and 
trades (described as “manufactures”) to the realm. This practice continued 
under the rule of Queen Elizabeth I and James I, but not without alleged 
abuses of the privilege, which were brought to the fore in Darcy v. Allen173 
and ultimately banished sometime after the enactment of the Statute of Mo-
nopolies. That the subject matter for which the Crown might grant a patent 
was broad is clear in the language in which Darcy v. Allen is described and 
in the report of The Clothworkers of Ipswich, which links the patent incen-
tive to the introduction of any new trade into the realm, either by way of 
importation or invention.174 From the descriptions of patentability in these 
documents, it seems inconceivable that a patent granted for a new trade at 
that time would have been invalid if it involved the use of a method that did 
not operate upon a physical object when invoked. 
We see in the Statute of Monopolies no intention to place no fetters on 
the scope of patentable subject matter so that the patent incentive would be 
available to encourage the introduction of any new trades and manufactures 
that might benefit the realm. Although the Statute of Monopolies may have 
outlawed odious monopolies, it said nothing of the types of subject matter 
that would qualify for a patent or restrictions on the scope of patentable sub-
ject matter. Its language certainly does nothing to impose a physicality re-
quirement. 
Instead, the focus of the Statute of Monopolies is newness; the statute 
was enacted to ensure that monopolies were not granted in respect of exist-
ing industries or trades that were known in the realm so as to prevent abuse. 
In the Industrial Age cases that were decided after the Privy Council 
divested itself of the jurisdiction to hear patent matters and passed that juris-
diction to the common law courts in 1752, a line of authority begins in the 
opinion of Chief Justice Eyre in Boulton and Watt v. Bull employing a simi-
larly broad view of the subject matter for which a valid patent might be 
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granted.175 Evident in that line of cases is an understanding of the concept of 
an invention as being something independent of its manifestation or form. 
This is the basis upon which the courts’ early understanding of the concept 
of invention permitted the recognition of non-physical processes as patenta-
ble subject matter, and these cases set the scope of patentable subject matter. 
That scope conveys no place for a physicality requirement in the context of 
patentable subject matter and that a lack of physical embodiment in an in-
vention is not to be equated with a claimed invention being a mere abstract 
or philosophical principle. 
When the first United States Patent Act came into being in 1790, it was 
“derived from the principles and practice which have prevailed in the con-
struction of that of England.”176 While it may have been unclear as to 
whether improvements to existing products or processes that did not involve 
the creation of a new machine or device were patentable in England, the 
enumerated categories of statutory subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101 make 
clear that the scope of patentable subject matter was intended to be broad 
and encompassing, as recognized in modern cases such as Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty.177 
This article argues that this broad conception of invention is something 
independent of the subject matter’s material form. This argument is as rele-
vant today as it was at the time of Boulton and Watt v. Bull, Hornblower v. 
Boulton, and The King v. Wheeler. Furthermore, that broad concept of in-
vention was replicated in the United States by framers who intended to im-
prove the English system by ensuring that the scope of patentable subject 
matter would be less restrictive. 
The history of the patent system demonstrates that its original focus on 
the production, use, and alteration of physical artifacts is a by-product of 
dated notions of technology, and this does not mean the patent incentive was 
intended to be so limited.178 Nothing in patent system history definitively 
states that the patent incentive was ever limited to inventions of a physical 
nature. Instead, patent law history supports the development of mercantilist 
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and developmental aims. Imposing a physicality requirement is in no way 
consistent with and does nothing to advance those aims. 
The historically justified alternative to using such bright-line criteria is 
deciding subject-matter eligibility by reference to the simple question of 
whether a claimed invention reduces a scientific principle, natural phenom-
ena, or idea to a specific and useful practical application. This approach al-
lows novelty, non-obviousness, and adequacy of disclosure to play a greater 
role in determining whether a patent should issue in respect of a particular 
invention.179 
This technology-neutral approach to patent eligibility has been adopted 
in the drafting of Article 27.1 of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS Agreement”). 
Like the Statute of Monopolies that preceded it, the TRIPS Agreement does 
not define “invention” and does not distinguish between patentable inven-
tions issuing from the laws of science, natural phenomena, and abstract dis-
coveries. It instead requires that patents “shall be available for any inven-
tions . . . in all fields of technology, provided they are new, involve an in-
ventive step[,] and are capable of industrial application.”180 This historically 
consistent approach recognizes that patent law is about achieving an appro-
priate balance between the need to provide private rights sufficient to en-
courage innovation and the public’s right to use and build upon existing 
ideas. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
While the focus of the patent system has historically been on the pro-
duction and manipulation of physical artifacts that are the domain of indus-
try, chemistry, and engineering, the history of patent law and practice does 
not support the view that patent law’s incentive function is in fact limited to 
promoting innovation in these fields. Instead, the history of patent law, from 
the Venetian patent statute of 1474 to the adoption of a patent system in the 
United States, supports a broad view of patentable subject matter, free of 
artificial fetters such as a physicality requirement. 
The patent system has always been about creating incentives to inno-
vate, to bring new products and processes to market, and to disclose new 
technologies to the public. The incentives have always been limited in dura-
tion to enable others to learn and use the technology without restriction once 
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the exclusivity period has come to an end. This is entirely consistent with 
the notions that innovation is the production of new information, 
knowledge, and ideas and that technology is little more than the application 
of information or knowledge to do new things. It is the process of creating 
better and more useful information. It is entirely consistent with the notion 
of information being an ordinary material good that is both an input and a 
product of the innovative process. 
Given the nature of innovation in the Information Age and the relation-
ship it bears with the incentives to innovate and invest in innovation that 
patent law provides, it makes little sense to limit the scope of patentable 
subject matter by introducing a physicality requirement. Because the inno-
vation promoted by the patent system is nothing more than the creation of 
new knowledge and ideas and is not contingent on the creation of new ma-
chines, physical devices and transformative methods, its progress will not be 
served well by limiting the scope of patentable subject matter to traditional 
manufacturing and physicality-based industrial technologies. 
 
